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Jason Lohr

My first term with the Honors program at PSU was a constant battle between exhilaration and vertigo. Socrates made the
search for meaning and truth seem so pleasurable. This was not my
experience. I became a philosophy junkie and the Honors faculty
provided my fix. Friends became increasingly alarmed at my
bizarre behavior and language. And throughout the year I became
increasingly dependent on a mysterious discipline called humanities. Anxious for every class to begin, I reeled back and forth
between excitement and confusion. This chaotic interlude in my
life seems now quite like a dream.
For a short period of time this last summer I kicked the
habit. After a period of withdrawal I began to feel much healthier.
Occasionally I would see a book that tempted me but fortunately,
for a time, I proved stronger than the addiction. Not until I
received a letter from Dr. Wheeler did I even consider indulging,
again, in my former discipline. Dr. Wheeler inquired about the
possibility of using my paper on the Cratylus for the Anthos. It was
not until I reread my paper that I became fully aware of how sick I
had been the previous year. Though I was repulsed by what I read,
there remained inside me a burning desire to read and write and
explore in the same way I had the year before. Addictions such as
these are hard to kick. I am sorry t9 say I have not been successful
in my rehabilitation.
So I must apologize for the following explication. I was in
the deepest sickness when it was composed. Perhaps one day I will
be able to look at my explication with a sober eye. If this is possible, I will rejoice in the stability and permanence of a motionless
world, a world devoid of dizzy philosophers such as myself

Socrates' Embassy to Cratylus
Reading the Cratylus is not unlike walking through a hall
of mirrors; reflections of centuries of intellectual thought
dance about in a seemingly chaotic manner. One finds it necessary to smash the more troubling images in order to find a
comprehensible structure beneath. As the fragments fall, one
searches for that particular combination of images that brings
meaning. This writer's vision is of an epic battle, a battle over
the origin of language and more importantly its product:
Philosophy. Socrates will try to demonstrate the difference
between his philosophy, true philosophy; and its antithesis,
what Socrates might think of as secular philosophy, or philosophy which denies the stability of truth. Socrates snubs the
Sophists but seems pre-eminently concerned with the philosophy of Heraclitus: philosophy which to Socrates represents a
world out of control. Indeed Socrates goes to great lengths to
enlighten young Cratylus.
To find meaning in the Cratylus, one is particularly dependent on Plato's imagery. Plato denies the reader any explicit
frame of reference in the Cratylus. The reader is presented with
a fait en progreso Socrates is, in a sense, invoked like a muse to
participate in the question of the origin of language. Indeed
there are numerous references to a divine nature in Socrates.
These allusions stretch from mere oracle reading (384) to a
confession by Socrates of his possession by Euthyphro (396d)
to the accusation by Cratylus that Socrates is himself an Oracle
(428c). Plato also points out when Socrates is "at the top of
[his] bent" (415), which nicely cues the reader to the consequential ascending and descending action of the dialogue. At
this point even Hermogenes, who otherwise has remained pas5

sive, recognizes the "shabby etymology" (414c) and trickery of
Socrates' intellectual aristeia.
As muse, Socrates weaves a story of the origin of language.
His is a story laden with allusions to Homer and the Iliad.
Plato braces the reader, by allusion to Homer, for the intellec, tual onslaught that is to come. And by means of the allusions
to the Iliad, the reader may draw a parallel between Socrates
and Achilles. Hermogenes will blindly follow Socrates to the
river "men call Scamander" (391e) where Socrates, as Achilles,
pushes to the very limit man's ability to reason. During this
story Socrates' muse will "tell many lies that pass for the truth"
(Hesiod, Theogony) but the reader should not be surprised.
Socrates explicitly warns Hermogenes of the "tricks" he will
play (393d). And to those familiar with Homer, Plato's allusion
to Hera's treachery (392) (393b) should signal that Socrates as
Achilles should not be trusted.
Socrates' debate with Hermogenes explicitly and implicitly
presents an antithesis to what Socrates would consider true
philosophy. Socrates, like the mathematician mentioned in the
dialogue (436d), makes seemingly self-conscious erroneous
assumptions about the origins of language. Often Socrates
stops to refrain: "1 dare say that 1 am talking great nonsense"
(401e) or "1 knew nothing" (391b). Socrates then follows with
proofs based on these assumptions which in context seem reasonable, but which he later points out are fundamentally problematic: "1 am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view that
[I] have worked out" (428b). As the dialogue continues,
Socrates, w:ho at times seems madly out of control, creates
schemas of reasoning which ascend in both complexity and
absurdity. A good example is Socrates' etymology of the gods.
Socrates gives one concise etymology for Demeter (404c) and
ascends to Apollo, who by Socrates' account has no less than
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four etymological derivations (405, b-e). Though certainly
proving that Socrates is an old' hand at etymology, it fails to
bring the reader any closer to the truth on the nature of language or otherwise.
Implicitly, during the dialogue with Hermogenes, Socrates
plays the role of mad Achilles, out to conquer philosophy bi
any means necessary. Socrates, however, is feigning madness.
Numerous allusions to races (410e) (414b) (420d) (423a) suggest to the reader that this discourse is simply an intellectual
game. Like Patroclus, Socrates has put on "the lion's skin"
(411).
During the {:ourse of the dialogue occasionally Socrates
emerges from beneath the lion's skin to slight the Sophists
(384b) (391c) (398e), and later Heraclitus (402) (411c).
Socrates assumably is aware of Cratylus' inclination toward the
philosophy of Heraclitus, and tries in a number of ways to
show its failings. Socrates' debate with Hermogenes certainly
seems to show the failings of the dialectic gone wild. But perhaps the best example of Socrates' belief is in the following
mean-spirited thrust at Heraclitus:
"I believe that the primeval givers of names were undoubtedly like
too many of our modern day philosophers, who,.in their search
after the nature of things, are always getting dizzy from constantly
going round and round, and then they imagine that the world is
going round and round and moving in all directions. And this
appearance, which arises out of their own internal condition, they
suppose to be the reality of naturej they think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux: and motion." (311 c)

Plato, through Homer, illustrates the point of Socrates' musings: the embassy to Cratylus. Cratylus enters the dialogueue
late. Socrates has finished his intellectual aristeia and once
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again the imagery shifts. Cratylus now assumes the role of
Achilles to tell Socrates-who ironically assumes, the role of
Ajax, a pair with a similar grim fate-he has "spoken in all
things to my mind" (428c). Socrates feigns appreciation knowing that the dialogueue was ill conceived: "It is quite terrible,
and therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and ... to
endeavor to look fore and aft" (428c). And Socrates does by
formulating a concise argument on the nature of language and,
more importantly, truth. Socrates. hopes that an appeal to
Cratylus' reasoning, without trickery, will inspire Cratylus to a
new philosophical paradigm. Cratylus follows Socrates' argumentation to the end, where both agree that "we must learn the
truth" (439b). But like Achilles, Cratylus cannot be fully
swayed. The new philosophy of Heraclitus is too attractive.
Socrates' embassy to Cratylus has failed. Although Cratylus
accepts Socrates' reasoning he will not accept his oracle.
Socrates desperately wants Cratylus to understand that
whether the river is called Xanthus or Scamander it is still a
river. "[there cannot be knowledge] if everything is in a state of
transition and there is nothing abiding. For knowledge too
cannot continue to be knowledge unless continuing always to
abide and exist" (440b). The river is truth. Philosophy as a tool
may bring us closer to the truth but if we believe there is no
truth to be found, the search will be fruitless.
Plato, in the Cratylus, promotes truth as the principle men
should aspire to. Perhaps Plato, Socrates' puppeteer, is concerned about the advancing freedom a society gains from
philosophical discourse: Heraclitus' world spinning wildly
without the arm of god to steady it. Indeed in The Laws it
appears that Plato is cO'ncerned about a society which does not
have the divine leadership of an earlier era. But like the origin
of words, w,e will never understand for certain Plato's meaning.
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Socrates beckons us to, by example, smash the dialogue in
search for meaning. In doing so; one cannot be sure if ~ne has
exited through the same door one has entered or not. It is certain, however, that Socrates would have approved of the search
for Plato's truth.

Bibliography
Plato, Phaedo. &is. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Princeton
University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1961.

9

